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Paramilitary, vigilante and militia groups have a long and colourful history in 
Indonesia. Prevalent throughout the colonial period, the Indonesian national army 
itself was originally formed from such groups, pointing to the longstanding historical 
ambiguity between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ uses of violence (Cribb 1991). 
During the New Order, as has been well documented, the state fostered and utilized a 
number of quasi-official organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila, and Pemuda 
Pancamarga (Ryter 1998). Drawing from gangs and the criminal underworld of 
preman (thugs), these groups acted as ‘assistants’ to the regime, employing the time-
proven methods of physical and psychological intimidation in carrying out what 
O’Rourke refers to as ‘regime maintenance’ chores (O’Rourke 2002: 11).1 Aside from 
these groups, a symbiotic relationship also existed between street level preman and 
the military and political and social elites, referred to simply as beking (backing). 
Preman were allowed to carry out their activities, such as protection rackets and 
control over a particular localized sector of the economy, in return for a cut of the 
profits that would make its way through the various levels of the state bureaucracy. 
Violence and criminality were normalized as state practice. 
Since the collapse of the New Order in 1998 and the beginning of ‘reformasi’, 
incidents of state sponsored violence have comparatively declined, however this has 
been accompanied by an upsurge in violence, coercion and extortion carried out by 
paramilitary, criminal and vigilante groups that are largely independent of state 
control. The fragmentation of the centralized state and the resulting rivalry between 
groups seeking economic and political power at the national level and control over 
resources at the local has been a central factor in this proliferation of violent thuggery. 
Groups with a variety of agendas have employed the violent mobilization of 
supporters as a central political strategy. Decentralization reforms initiated since 1999 
have given greater economic and political autonomy at the provincial and sub-district 
levels. These reforms have also led to an increase in conflicts between groups trading 
in violence as political and civil organizations fight over ‘turf’, economic resources 
and constituencies that were previously the exclusive domain of the New Order.2  
This article intends to outline some of the recent historical events that I will 
argue have played a significant role in the ‘democratization’ of violence in post New 
Order Indonesia, namely the impact of the state sponsored Pamswakarsa vigilante 
force mobilized in 1999, and the subsequent boom in paramilitary ‘task forces’ 
attached to political parties. I will then go on to examine the structure, actions and 
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practices of two of the many vigilante groups that have emerged post New Order. 
Behind the differences of their respective history, ideology and politics, all share a 
common set of practices based upon the use of organized violence. The first of these, 
the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug) is a group claiming to 
represent working class members of the indigenous Betawi ethnic group of Jakarta, 
which combines appeals to ethnicity and class with a strategy of extortion and 
coercion. The second is the Defenders of Islam Front (FPI: Front Pembela Islam), one 
of a number of vigilante style groups employing the symbols of militant Islam to 
emerge post New Order that has conducted a street level war against ‘immorality’. I 
intend to demonstrate that these and similar groups have emerged as a consequence of 
the fragmentation of state power post-1998. This case study of Indonesia also has 
broader implications in terms of making problematic one of the most basic 
assumptions regarding the state: that it has an internal monopoly over the legitimate 
production of violence and security. As I will show, the increasing privatization of 
violence that has occurred in Indonesia post New Order demonstrates that the state no 
longer possesses a monopoly over either its production or legitimate use. Far from the 
consolidation of formal institutions of power, democratisation in Indonesia has 
involved a more fragmented intertwining with informal constellation of power.  
 
PARA-MILITARISING THE PUBLIC: PAMSWAKARSA AND POLITICAL 
‘TASK FORCES  
The roots of the growth in paramilitary and vigilante activity in Indonesia post-1998 
were established during the New Order. Via the development of a corporatist state, 
the New Order co-opted and politicized ‘youth’ as a form of political capital. The 
military concept of ‘total people’s defence and security’ justified the use of civilian 
groups as proxies by the state apparatus (Lowry 1996: 88). As Lindsay has argued, the 
New Order operated in a way analogous to a criminal gang, employing and 
normalizing violence and extortion as state practice(Lindsey 2001). The removal of 
Suharto in 1998 meant not the complete collapse of patrimonial networks and 
authoritarian structures, but rather the loss of their central focal hub, so that they 
loosened into decentralized and competing power centres.  
An event that highlighted the extent and speed with which the strong nation-
state unravelled after Suharto’s departure was the Pamswakarsa ‘self-help’ civilian 
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guard formed by Gen. Wiranto and Gen. Kivlan Zein in late 1998. In the lead up to 
the special legislative session of the People’s Consultative Assembly in November 
1998, around 30,000 civilians were recruited by the army and mobilized around the 
national parliament. The rag-tag civilian security force was intended to bolster the 
over stretched police force and help counter widespread opposition to the Habibie 
presidency.3 With its public profile at an all time low, the armed forces felt compelled 
to resort to using proxies armed with bamboo spears to carry out the task of defending 
state interests. The composition of the Pamswakarsa forces revealed an alliance of 
largely militant Muslim groups sympathetic to Habibie, such as Furkon (Muslim 
Forum to Uphold the Constitution and Justice) and the Front Pembela Islam, 
alongside a hotchpotch of martial arts and youth groups from Banten, nationalist 
organizations such as Pemuda Pancasila and the ranks of the unemployed (Tempo 30 
November 1998a). The circulation of rumours that ‘anti-Islamic’ forces would 
attempt to derail the session and overthrow the Habibie government led to other 
Muslim groups mobilizing forces around the MPR (Tempo 30 November 1998b). The 
presence of the Pamswakarsa further provoked an already tense situation resulting in 
violent clashes with student demonstrators and locals that left fatalities on both sides 
(Gatra 21 November 1998). Public outrage and political pressure soon led to its 
disbandment. 
As a state political strategy the Pamswakarsa exercise was undeniably a 
failure, however it had a more lasting impact in a number of respects.4 Firstly, whilst 
being the continuation of a pattern familiar during the New Order, of the military 
employing civilian proxies to do its dirty business, the Pamswakarsa was on a scale 
not seen before. It was the largest mobilization of civilian forces by the state since the 
1960s, reflecting the state’s recognition that it could no longer legitimate centralized 
violent suppression of peaceful dissent. There was also an unintentional flow on 
effect. As Bourchier notes, the government’s decision to form a civilian militia was 
partly a response to the already large and well-organized paramilitary wings of PDI-P 
and Nahdatul Ulama (Bourchier 1999: 165). However there was also a reverse effect; 
political parties, religious and civil organizations began forming and expanding their 
own paramilitary forces in reaction to the prevalence of state-sponsored vigilantes. 
The result was a spiraling in the number of both civil and state backed paramilitary 
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and vigilante groups. It reflected a new awareness, ‘if the state can do it, why cant 
we?’ 
Suspicion and mistrust of the army and police was also at an all-time high 
resulting in many people turning to local preman, paramilitary and vigilante groups 
for security. A new decentralized intersection between criminal and political interests 
established itself. During the New Order, the state had justified the mobilisation of 
civilian militia and thugs by reference to the constitution, which states the 
responsibility of citizens to defend the nation. With the weakening of state power and 
the ideology of collectivist nationalism, groups with a variety of political, economic 
and social agendas now did the same, a phenomenon referred to by some 
commentators as the ‘I am Indonesia’ syndrome (Munir 2003). By appealing to 
religious affiliation, the Pamswakarsa also legitimated a new pole for political 
mobilisation post New Order, lifting the taboo on invoking primordial sentiments.   
The economic crisis of 1997 saw the ranks of the urban poor increase 
significantly and many found themselves forced into crime and violence (Nordholt 
2002). A greater opening for preman and organized crime began to emerge. In the 
post New Order environment gangsters have become far more organized in the big 
cities, not just operating individually but forming organizations, often along ethnic or 
religious lines, that have gradually established control over public space such as bus 
terminals, markets and food stalls. With the patronage and protection of the New 
Order gone, preman were forced to seek out new patrons, or simply went ‘private’. 
The enforcement partnerships that existed between the state and criminal gangs 
fragmented and has been replaced by sets of shifting contractual arrangements with 
political parties, members of the political and economic elite, local officials, business 
people and other interest groups.  
 
SECURING SUPPORT: THE ‘TASK FORCES’ OF THE POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
Political liberalization post New Order had resulted in the emergence of over 100 new 
political parties by the time of the 1999 general elections. On the streets of major 
cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung, the scramble by the new parties to form 
paramilitary forces presented itself as a golden opportunity for the ranks of preman 
and unemployed youth. Replete with military style uniforms and helmets, command 
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structures, and an aggressive ‘us against the rest’ mentality, the satgas paramilitary 
wings of the political parties reflected the reproduction of New Order style militarism 
within the new political culture. Satgas groups in themselves are not a new 
phenomenon, and were first established by Golkar, PPP and the PDI in the early 
1980’s. However, it was with the reintroduction of multi-party competitive elections 
in 1999 that a ‘party arms race’ began (King 2003). Almost all political parties have 
some form of active paramilitary wing, as well as numerous associated ‘supporter’ 
groups, membership numbering in the tens, possibly hundreds of thousands. 
Officially, the function of satgas is for internal party security, such as protecting party 
assets and controlling the membership. The reality has been that satgas have been akin 
to private mercenary armies, intimidating opponents and critics both within and 
outside of the party, providing ‘muscle’ for the private sector and operating their own 
protection rackets alongside of other criminal activities. They have acted as a nexus 
between legitimate political power, and criminality. Satgas groups have provided a 
vehicle by which preman can gain legitimacy and concessions within the political 
system, and also a means by which politicians can establish working relations with the 
criminal underworld. The 1999 elections were peppered with incidents of violence 
and coercion, most involving satgas from the major parties, PDI-P, PPP, Golkar and 
PKB. While on the surface many of these clashes appeared to be caused by political 
rivalries, often the conflict was over control of local resources by preman within 
satgas ranks. By the end of the 1999 elections and into 2000-2002 paramilitary and 
vigilante forces had emerged as a conspicuous and intimidating presence on the 
streets and in public consciousness (Panji 2000). 
Of all the political parties, the PDI-P has had perhaps the largest menagerie of 
paramilitary and militia style ‘supporter’ groups. The four main groups linked to the 
PDI-P at the national level have been the PDI-P Security Taskforce (Satgas PDI-P), 
the Indonesian Young Bulls (Banteng Muda Indonesia), the Defend Mbak Mega 
Command (Komando Bela Mbak Mega), and the ‘elite’ Alert One Brigade (Brigass: 
Brigade Siaga Satu), led by the former student activist Pius Lustrilanang. Of the four, 
only the Satgas PDI-P is formally incorporated within the party structure, and hence 
accountable to it. The Young Bulls is an informally affiliated ‘youth’ organization 
headed by East Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres, whereas the Defend Mbak 
Mega Command is a militant Megawati loyalist group.5
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Brigass is interesting as an example of the degree to which some previously 
strident critics of New Order militarism have reproduced it post-1998. It was initially 
conceived as the ‘elite’ guard of the PDI-P, consisting of around 200 highly trained 
‘troops’ (Supriyanto 2002). Rumoured to be financed by Megawati’s husband, Taufik 
Kiemas, Brigass was formed in 1999 in order to raise support for her unsuccessful 
presidential campaign.6 It did this by mobilising supporters around the 1999 Special 
Session of the MPR. Despite Megawati’s failure to secure the presidency, the group 
did not disband, instead establishing headquarters in Bogor, West Java. Recruiting 
from amongst taxi-drivers, labourers and security guards, its membership quickly 
grew to around 3500 (Supriyanto 2002: 16). Adopting a centralised military style 
command structure, the group is strictly controlled by Lustrilanang, who is 
deferentially referred to as ‘commander in chief’ (panglima). If the PDI-P satgas are 
the ‘foot soldiers’ of the party, then Brigass is its ‘special-forces’, ironic considering 
that its leader was kidnapped along with other student activists by Kopassus special 
forces troops in the aftermath of the government orchestrated overthrow of 
Megawati’s leadership of the PDI in 1996. Brigass has received training from ex-
special forces troops, including those who were directly involved in abducting 
Lustrilanang.  
Selection criteria for Brigass members are rigorous, and once accepted recruits 
undergo intensive and ongoing training in martial arts, crowd control and military 
type exercises, such as that provided by ex-special forces troops. Whilst PDI-P party 
membership is not compulsory, recruits undertake 16 hours of ‘political education’ 
and Lustrilanang ensures that all members channel their political aspirations to PDI-P 
(Supriyanto 2002: 18). Like many satgas groups, Brigass also offers its security 
services to the private sector as well as government institutions via its affiliated 
business, Brigass Lustrilanang Security (Pikiran Rakyat 2002, 2003). Despite its 
initial mandate as hardcore Megawati supporters, Brigass has recently developed into 
a largely freelance organization, independent from the internal political interests of 
the PDI-P. Through its private security service, and close links with government and 
military figures, it has come to resemble New Order period groups, such as Pemuda 
Pancasila, that are available for hire to the highest bidder. 
Unlike Brigass, the Satgas PDI-P has been formally integrated within the PDI-
P party structure as its internal security branch. At the national level it is led by 
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Maringan Pangaribuan and has an estimated membership at 10-50,000.7 Through 
neighbourhood command posts known as posko established during the campaign 
period of the 1999 elections, PDI-P satgas were able to establish a constant and 
intimidating presence at the local level. The size of Satgas PDI-P has perhaps meant 
that factionalism and internal conflict were inevitable. Factional loyalties between 
supporters of local candidates, as well as vertical conflicts between the national level 
party leadership and provincial branches have been frequent. Local PDI-P satgas 
groups have emerged as crucial players in factional fighting within regional branches 
of the party, usually linked to the selection of candidates for the local legislature, and 
the positions of mayor and regent. In Tegal, for example, PDI-P satgas went on a 
rampage after the head of the Tegal PDI-P lost in the election for mayor (Sinar 
Harapan  2004a). Similar instances of inter-satgas violence have occurred in Medan, 
Surabaya, Pemalang, Tulungagung, Banyumas, Mojokerto, and Jember. Like Brigass, 
PDI-P satgas have also regularly worked as freelance security, including breaking up 
labour actions by factory workers, and acting as bodyguards for business executives 
(Bernas 2000).8  
In PDI-P rhetoric, satgas forces consist of ‘grass roots’ supporters, and its 
members are largely recruited from disenfranchised urban youth, rank and file party 
cadre and local preman (PDI-P official 2003). With scant job prospects and with the 
rising cost of living, the satgas units have provided legitimacy and a sense of identity 
and empowerment for the ranks of unemployed youth.9 PDI-P specifically targeted 
youths, conducting recruitment drives amongst unemployed senior high school 
graduates unable to study at university  (Supriyanto 2002: 16). As satgas membership 
automatically confers PDI-P party membership, it becomes an effective strategy for 
developing a mass base that can be quickly mobilised. Apologists within the PDI-P 
have argued that the training, structure and discipline involved in becoming a satgas is 
a means for ‘reforming’ preman, and provides them with an opportunity to become 
‘useful members of society’(PDI-P official 2003). As such, the parties provide a 
valuable social service for a marginalised social group. The argument is a convenient 
and familiar one, and was used throughout the New Order to rationalise the existence 
of groups such as Pemuda Pancasila.  On the contrary, it is the very fact that they are 
preman that makes them a valuable asset to the party. As the ICG has noted in its 
report on civil militias in Bali and Lombok, local political candidates have found that 
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the support of key criminal figures and civil militias is considered proof of political 
power. Consequently, rather than endeavouring to eradicate crime and vigilantism, 
they have sought to ‘direct’ them, via the incorporation of their perpetrators  
(International Crisis Group 2003). 
Clashes in October 2003 in Bali between rival supporters of the PDI-P and 
Golkar left two dead, and renewed fears that the 2004 elections would be marred by 
more conflict sparked by rival paramilitary and supporter groups (Republika 2004b). 
Yet, as it turned out the elections passed with a notable absence of violence, and the 
feared satgas groups were conspicuously absent from the streets. This was partly due 
to the last minute introduction of regulation from the Indonesian Electoral 
Commission that imposed restrictions on the mobilization of satgas forces during 
campaigning, with the threat of sanctions against parties that failed to control their 
supporters (Indonesian Electoral Commission 2004). Since early 1999 moves had 
been made to introduce similar regulations, most notably from the police and armed 
forces, whom by that stage had already grown increasingly alarmed at the threat posed 
to their legitimacy by satgas. In 2002 Indonesia’s military chief Endriartono Sutarto 
called for the disbanding of all ‘extremist and militia groups’, including those 
affiliated with political parties and religious organizations (Sriwijaya Post 2002). In 
March 2003 the Minister for Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil also called for the 
disbanding of civil militias, especially those that used military style uniforms and 
symbols, and the curtailing of party satgas that used a ‘paramilitary approach’, stating 
that they were ‘inappropriate in a democratic system’ (Sinar Harapan 2003). The 
response from political parties however, particularly the PDI-P, was blunt: the 
military could no longer interfere in party affairs, and satgas were an internal party 
issue (Sriwijaya Post  2002). 
It appears that the primary reason behind satgas being sent ‘back to the 
barracks’ in 2004 was the changed political climate. Compared to the high emotions 
and enthusiasm surrounding the 1999 elections, the 2004 election year was 
surrounded by an atmosphere of marked indifference on the part of the voting public. 
A deepening cynicism towards the political process saw lacklustre turnouts to mass 
rallies. Voters enthusiastically exercised their new voting rights, however with 
ambivalence towards the available candidates. ‘Traditional’ methods of mobilising 
support no longer guaranteed success. Vote buying was still rampant throughout the 
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2004 campaign, but it proved far less effective, for how successful can bribery be 
when it cannot be backed up with at least the implied threat of repercussions? The 
possibility of voter backlash, coupled with the risk of reprisals from rival groups, 
outweighed the potential gains that were to be made by mobilising satgas. What this 
points to at the national level is that Indonesia’s new system of electoral democracy 
may have reduced the effectiveness of the mobilisation of satgas violence as a 
political strategy. As Tilly has argued, the value of the use or threat of force is 
determined in proportion to the value of the potential damage, be it financial or 
political that may be caused in the absence of either protection or patronage from a 
particular group (Tilly 1985). When the ‘market’ in violence comprises many players 
operating with similar resources, in this case the satgas forces of the major parties, the 
stakes involved in violent action increase dramatically which can act as a strong  
disincentive for its use. The voting public have emerged as the most effective 
deterrent.  
 
THE NEW VIGILANTISM  
While the political role of party satgas may have declined, other groups trading in 
violence and coercion have continued to make their presence felt on the streets. As 
has been discussed, the end of the New Order has seen a rapid increase in civil 
organizations representing a variety of social, cultural, political and economic 
interests and agendas that incorporate extensive and well trained paramilitary style 
militias and ‘security wings’. With burgeoning levels of crime vigilantism has also 
become widespread. The ineffectiveness of the weakened state in maintaining order 
has led to the establishment in many communities of vigilante groups ostensibly 
aimed at combating the symptoms of social and economic collapse, such as 
‘premanism’ and ‘vice’ (kemaksiatan). These non-state initiatives were at first 
welcomed in official quarters (International Crisis Group 2003: 1). Vigilantes were 
considered to be filling a space created by the separation of the police and military by 
providing policing and security at the community level. However in many instances, it 
was preman themselves that either established or infiltrated these groups in order to 
establish a new legitimacy, often with official backing, both financial and moral. The 
post New Order state has attempted to resolve the argument against the previous 
centralised patronage network via the introduction of decentralisation reforms in 
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1999. In theory, this devolving of power would help foster local leadership and 
autonomy. To an extent this has been the case, however it has also given a new quasi-
legality to long-standing patron-client relations, and allowed local interests to 
consolidate control over resources and markets without institutional checks or rule of 
law. The new vigilantes combine the pragmatic self-interest and reliance on violence 
of the preman with a justificatory moral ideology. In the following examples, the 
Betawi Brotherhood Forum and the Defenders of Islam Front, this ideology is one of 
defending the interests of an imagined ethnic and religious community.  
  
The Betawi Brotherhood Forum 
The FBR was formally established on 27 July 2001, the anniversary of the 1996 
overthrow of Megawati’s leadership of the PDI. The date was not mere coincidence: 
FBR’s head, Fadloli el-Muhir, was himself a former chair of the Jakarta branch of the 
anti-Megawati faction of the PDI. More recently, he served as a member of the 
Indonesian Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung). Fadloli 
conceived of the FBR as a forum for reclaiming Jakarta for middle and lower class 
members of the indigenous Betawi ethnic group. Ostensibly aimed at gaining 
employment for its largely blue-collar, unemployed and preman membership, FBR 
currently has around 10,000 members throughout Jakarta.10 In the words of Fadloli:  
Our aim is for Betawi people to become jawara in their own 
neighbourhood. As the indigenous people of Jakarta, we should be enjoying 
the fruits of its growth. Unfortunately, many businesses do not employ local 
people, and don’t contribute to the community in any significant way (el-
Muhir 2003).  
According to Fadloli, throughout the New Order the Betawi were culturally and 
politically marginalised. This marginalisation has been compounded by 
‘globalisation’ and has led to a loss of ethnic and cultural identity: ‘The first step we 
need to take post New Order is to raise our heads, to stop cowering and take pride in 
our ethnicity’ (el-Muhir 2002). There is a large number of groups representing the 
ethnic Betawi in Jakarta, 67 of whom are affiliated with the umbrella organisation the 
Betawi Consultative Body (Bamus Betawi) led by Abdul Syukur. FBR however 
refused to join Bamus Betawi, considering it as only representing the interests of the 
‘elite’ and not those of poor and working class Betawi (el-Muhir 2003). FBR strongly 
identifies itself as a voice for the Betawi underclass.  
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In and around its headquarters in the Ziyadatul Muslim boarding school 
situated in Cakung, East Jakarta, FBR has a firm hold over the informal economy. For 
example, on becoming a member of FBR, local ojek motorbike chauffeurs are 
provided with interest free loans to assist them in buying their own motorbike. The 
organisation runs a number of other local economic initiatives for its members, such 
as screen printing workshops and food stall cooperatives, similar to those employed 
by NGO’s working with the urban poor. However FBR’s concern for the poor 
apparently extends only to its own membership, and its control of the informal sector 
has not occurred without conflict. A dispute in 2002 over control of the lucrative 
parking market in Cakung between Maduranese preman and FBR members soon 
escalated into a riot. In its aftermath, there was one fatality and several seriously 
injured  (Suara Merdeka  2002b). FBR claimed that the incident was a product of 
ethnic tensions resulting from uncontrolled migration into the capital. Indigenous 
Betawi and not migrant ethnic groups such as the Maduranese should control the 
sectors of the informal local economy such as parking (FBR official 2003). Social ills 
such as prostitution and gambling are also attributed to non-Jakartans. Several bars 
and cafes in Cakung run by non-Betawi have been attacked by FBR on the grounds of 
eliminating ‘immorality’. Perceiving the social, moral and economic cohesion of the 
ethnic community as under threat, FBR considers its use of violence as a legitimate 
act of self-defence.   
FBR’s organisational structure consists of a central governing board that 
mirrors a mini-government, with separate ‘departments’ for culture, economy, law 
and security. The emphasis however is firmly upon ‘security’. FBR security personnel 
are called dedengkot, a colloquial Betawi term for ‘big shot’. The security wing 
employs a hierarchical structure similar to those found in local pencak silat martial 
arts associations, from where many of its members are recruited (Wilson 2002). The 
head of the security wing is referred to as a jawara. In Betawi culture, a jawara is 
both a figure of reverence and fear who is believed to have martial and magical 
powers.11 The second in command following jawara is pendekar, traditionally an 
honorary title given to an esteemed master of pencak silat. Under the command of 
each pendekar are several hundred regular members known as pitung, named after Si 
Pitung, the robin hood-type social bandit of Betawi folk legend.12 The FBR also has 
an ‘elite’ group of security personnel considered to have advanced martial ability and 
supernatural skills. In Cakung FBR has 115 security posts, known as gardu, that are 
 11
coordinated by the central board. Ostensibly in order to ‘fill the void’ left by the 
understaffed and underpaid police, the gardu are an adaptation of the siskamling local 
security/surveillance system established during the New Order. Aside from 
conducting neighbourhood patrols, gardu also organise various ‘cultural’ services, 
such as performances of Betawi arts, traditional weddings, etc, which provide an 
opportunity for drawing in new members. When I visited FBR’s headquarters in 2003, 
the street was filled with around 70 well-built men wearing black and camouflage 
military style uniforms emblazoned with the FBR logo waiting to go on ‘patrol’ of the 
neighbourhood, some armed with wooden batons and barely concealed machetes. The 
group also has its own intelligence agents who ‘collect information’ on suspected 
drug dealers, petty criminals, gambling operators and potential ‘trouble-makers’ (Van 
Tillen 1995).13 FBR are a conspicuous and intimidating presence in the area.  
According to Fadloli, since the establishment of the gardu, crime rates in 
surrounding areas have dropped. At the same time, FBR membership has grown. The 
perhaps unintentional suggestion was that crime dropped because its perpetrators now 
wore FBR uniforms, for intimidation and extortion is only illegitimate and hence 
criminal when it is done by those who do not have a ‘right’ to do so. Businesses and 
street traders operating in FBR territory are expected to make regular ‘contributions’ 
to their local gardu. In the Pulo Gadung industrial area, FBR tax trucks a 1000 rupiah 
entrance fee. In early 2002 an alleged extortion letter from FBR sent to businesses in 
Pulo Gadung and Cakung surfaced in the press. In the letter, signed by both Fadloli 
and the group’s secretary, FBR requested monthly donations to cover group 
‘operational costs’ and as a sign of support for ethnic Betawi, threatening retribution 
against those who refused (Kompas 2002b, 2002c). Whilst questioning the 
authenticity of the letter, Fadloli defended it in principle, saying that businesses that 
benefited from the security the gardu provided should contribute. Business also has a 
‘moral obligation’ to assist the indigenous population FBR claims to represent (el-
Muhir 2003). The FBR has regularly demonstrated, picketed and intimidated 
businesses and shopping malls that have refused to employ its members (Kompas 
2003a, 2004a).  
The group first gained public notoriety in March 2002 when members attacked 
peaceful demonstrators outside the Indonesian Human Rights Commission. The 
demonstrators, members of the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), had just left a meeting 
with the Indonesian Human Rights Commission in which they sought its support in 
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the upholding of a decision of the Jakarta district court that the Jakarta administration 
led by Sutiyoso had unlawfully evicted and arrested Pedi cab drivers, buskers, street 
vendors and street children.14 The vicious attack, in which men, women and children 
were beaten and hit with wooden clubs, resulted in 17 being hospitalised. Wardah 
Hafidz, the coordinator of UPC, had a machete held to her throat. Two weeks earlier 
FBR members had also attacked flood victims demanding government assistance at 
the Jakarta City Hall. Why would FBR so violently oppose a peaceful demonstration 
in support of the rights of the urban poor? According to Fadloli, the UPC and other 
NGO’s ‘provoke and manipulate the poor for their own agenda … what’s more they 
ignore the FBR’ (el-Muhir 2003). Considering the territorial nature of the group, 
perhaps it considered the UPC a rival for its main constituency. Commentators in the 
media however, along with Wardah Hafidz, saw the action as evidence that the FBR 
was on the pay-roll of Jakarta’s governor Sutiyoso, who as the administrative head of 
Jakarta was the object of the UPC protest (Hafidz 2003).15  
The relationship between Fadloli and Sutiyoso extends back to at least 1996 
and the New Order orchestrated storming of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta. At the 
time Sutiyoso was Jakarta Military Commander, and has been implicated in helping to 
co-ordinate the thugs involved in the attack. He is said to have been promoted to 
governor in 1997 as a reward from Suharto for his successful handling of the takeover 
(Jakarta Post 2002).  As mentioned, Fadloli at that time was prominent in the Suharto 
backed faction of the PDI from which Megawati had split.  The FBR was also 
established just two months after Sutiyoso officially declared his 2001 ‘war on thugs’ 
campaign (Jakarta Post 2001; Gamma  2001). Around 73 areas of preman activity 
were identified throughout the city, and a budget of 12 billion rupiah was allocated for 
the operation. Ostensibly aimed at addressing public concern over rising levels of 
street crime, in practice the campaign largely targeted street vendors and the 
homeless. Prior to the campaign, Sutiyoso consulted with preman groups such as the 
Betawi dominated Family of Tanah Abang Association (IKBT: Ikatan Keluarga Besar 
Tanah Abang) on strategies for dealing with the ‘preman problem’.16 The IKBT 
proposed that the Jakarta police give month long training programs for the 
unemployed in order to ‘prevent them from becoming thugs’ (Kompas 2001a). Those 
who completed the training would be employed as security guards for shops and 
businesses in their local district. Sutiyoso took to the idea. In order to carry out his 
‘cleansing’ program Sutiyoso deployed around 1900 civilian police assistants 
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(Banpol: Bantuan Polisi) in addition to the 800 regular police already assigned. The 
irony was that the Banpol were largely recruited from the ranks of the very preman 
that the program was supposedly aimed at eliminating (Gamma 2001). Not 
surprisingly then, when amongst great media fanfare Sutiyoso took to the streets of 
Tanah Abang, there were no preman insight, except for those now wearing Banpol 
uniforms. The following day however it was business as usual, with preman collecting 
entrance fees and ‘security’ money from taxi, bus and ojek drivers. It was only later 
that government officials revealed that preman were not the sole target of the 
operation, but that it also included the pedicab drivers, buskers and street vendors and 
others who ‘disturbed public order’.17 In effect, Sutiyoso recruited preman to 
‘eliminate’ themselves. Seeing the opportunity available to Betawi preman to work 
with the Jakarta administration, it was a politically opportune time to establish a new 
preman organisation. In this respect Fadloli’s choice of the 27 July as FBR’s founding 
day can be interpreted as a signal to Sutiyoso that, like IKBT, the FBR was available 
for hire. Considering that he faced re-election the following year, the move was 
politically a risky one for Sutiyoso. Weighing up the possibility of public backlash 
against the political benefits of gaining access to Betawi preman, Sutiyoso chose the 
latter. The ‘war on thugs’ campaign prompted several protest and strike actions by 
street vendors and bus drivers around Tanah Abang, however the issue quickly faded 
from public consciousness.  
It wasn’t until negative publicity emerged over FBR’s attack on the UPC that 
Sutiyoso was forced to publicly deny involvement with it and similar groups. He went 
even further, claiming to have never met Fadloli before (Republika 2002). Despite his 
refutation, several days later Sutiyoso attended a FBR gathering at which Fadloli 
supported his re-election as governor for 2002-2007  (Liputan6.com 2002a). Fadloli 
stated that, while in principle the FBR preferred a native of Jakarta as governor, it 
could accept a non-Betawi such as Sutiyoso as he had proven his commitment to 
improving the conditions of the indigenous population. Fadloli’s choice of political 
pragmatism over principle did not find unanimous support within FBR ranks. A 
significant faction in the group publicly backed the bid of former minister for 
women’s affairs, Tutty Alawiyah, on the grounds that she was ethnic Betawi (FBR 
member 2003). It appeared as if tensions had emerged between the political 
opportunism of FBR’s leadership and the ethnically driven ideology that motivated 
many rank-and-file members. The split was diffused uneventfully when Alawiyah 
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unexpectedly died of natural causes prior to the election. If Fadloli thought his support 
for Sutiyoso would secure special treatment for FBR he was soon to be disappointed. 
In May 2003 FBR leaders met with Sutiyoso to request that the Jakarta administration 
provide facilities for a ‘skills training centre’ for unemployed FBR members as part of 
its obligation to assist ethnic Betawi  (Kompas 2003b). Sutiyoso politely denied the 
request. Having secured his re-election, Sutiyoso no longer needed to court the 
controversial FBR.  
FBR’s other flirtation with those in power has been with former police chief 
Noegroho Djajoesman. Three months prior to the April 2004 legislative elections 
Noegroho established the ‘Save Indonesia Alliance’ (API: Aliansi Penyelamat 
Indonesia). The API was a curious mix of former activists and human rights 
advocates such as Hariman Siregar and Buyung Nasution, together with preman 
dominated groups such as FBR and the Muslim Workers Brotherhood. Fadloli was 
appointed deputy head of the alliance. Founded on an ‘anti-corruption’ platform, API 
supported the election of former military candidates, such as Wiranto and 
Yudhoyono. Mirroring the prediction of armed forces chief Sutarto, Noegroho 
threateningly suggested that the elections would fail, in which case API was ready to 
‘take action’ in ensuring a smooth transition to a stable government (Sinar Harapan 
2004b). In March 2004 FBR held its own rally, attended by presidential candidate 
Wiranto, in which the group affirmed its willingness to provide security for the 
upcoming elections, and ‘hammer anyone who makes trouble’ (el-Muhir 2003). 
However by the time of the second round of presidential elections in October, FBR 
had emerged as a vocal supporter of Megawati, a position contradicting their 
involvement with the anti-Megawati API. FBR hosted a public show of support for 
Megawati, who attended the event, in which Fadloli declared that she had made 
improvements in ‘every aspect of national life’ (Liputan6.com 2004a). Three days 
later hundreds of FBR members held a noisy demonstration outside the Indonesian 
Electoral Commission, protesting over the campaign leaflets produced by her rival 
Bambang Yudhoyono, claiming that it played upon religious sentiment  
(Liputan6.com 2004b). The seeming contradictions of FBR’s shifting political 
allegiances are justified by Fadloli as evidence of the group’s neutrality. Rather than 
seeking out patronage, Fadloli insists that ‘currently we are like a pretty girl, everyone 




The Defenders of Islam Front 
The Defenders of Islam Front (FPI: Front Pembela Islam) was one of the groups that 
emerged as part of the pro-Habibie 1998 Pamswakarsa forces. On 24 September 1998, 
a month after its founding, FPI made its first public appearance, attacking student 
activists at the Christian Atmajaya University on the pretext of challenging ‘left wing 
and Christian students who are paid by American Jews’ (Radio Nederland 
Wereldomroep 2000). One month later FPI was involved in a bloody pitched battle 
with Christian Ambonese security guards in Ketapang, Central Jakarta. In the 
aftermath 14 were dead and an indelible image was left in the public’s mind; of white 
robed and turbaned young men angrily wielding machetes and swords in the name of 
Islam (Gunawan and Patria 2000).  
The FPI was founded by Misbahul Alam, a Nahdatul Ulama educated 
preacher, and Habib Rizieq a habib preacher of mixed Arab-Betawi descent.18 It was 
one of a number of ‘radical’ Islamic organisations to emerge post New Order, such as 
Laskar Jihad and the Hizbut Tahrir. According to a report in Tajuk magazine, the FPI 
was originally planned as a nation wide support base for the Muslim United 
Development Party (PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) of Hamzah Haz, and 
modelled along the lines of the Banser paramilitary wing of Nahdatul Ulama (Tajuk 
1999). The emergence of the PPP aligned Ka’abah Youth Movement and the initial 
failure of FPI to create strong support bases outside of Jakarta saw it redefine itself as 
a street level ‘anti-vice’ movement.19 While its leadership consists of scholars from 
habib circles alongside several seasoned Muslim radicals of the New Order period, 
rank and file members are drawn mainly from the poor urban youth in districts of 
Jakarta, such as Tanah Abang and Depok. FPI’s uniform, consisting of long white 
robes and turbans, invokes popular representations of the ‘wali songo’, the nine 
Muslim saints believed to have spread Islam throughout Java (Gunawan and Patria 
2000). This romantic image drawn from popular myth, combined with the focus upon 
vigilante actions, religious instruction, martial arts training, and vehement attacks on 
US foreign policy, have proved irresistible to many disenfranchised urban youth.  By 
August 1999, Rizieq claimed to have up to three million militia members who were 
‘ready to fight’, with a total FPI membership of 13 million  (Gatra 1999). While this 
figure is greatly exaggerated, FPI’s membership did grow quickly. By 2003 it was 
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estimated to have around one hundred thousand members with branches in 22 
provinces.20  
Like the FBR, the FPI has a formal leadership hierarchy. A supreme advisory 
council reports directly to Habib Rizieq. The FPI secretariat is subdivided into six 
‘council fronts’, such as those for ‘anti-sinful practices’ and recruitment. The 
‘investigation council front’ is the group’s intelligence unit, which is believed to have 
coordinated the infiltration of FPI operatives into student organisations considered to 
be ‘communist’.21 This is supplemented by numerous government style departments, 
covering issues from foreign relations, national defence and education to women’s 
affairs and food distribution. The paramilitary wing used by FPI in its raids is known 
as the Laskar Pembela Islam. The Laskar hierarchy mirrors the territorial command 
structure of the Indonesian armed forces, with a chain of command and semi-
autonomous territorial units extending from the national down to the sub-district level. 
Recruits are given martial arts and ‘inner power’ training, such as physical 
invulnerability.  
FPI’s ideology centres upon two central themes. The first of these is the 
necessity for the insertion of the ‘Jakarta Charter’ into the Indonesian constitution. 
The Jakarta Charter, which obliges the application of Shari’a law to all Muslims, was 
proposed for inclusion in the original version of the 1945 Constitution by Islamic 
political parties, however was later dropped after objections from Christian 
nationalists. Since the end of the New Order, who outlawed discussion of the 
amendment, its re-inclusion has become a rallying point for a variety of Muslim 
groups and political parties. Unlike Laskar Jihad and Hizbut Tahrir, the FPI stops 
short of openly rejecting democracy. Somewhat reservedly, Misbahul Alam stated 
that ‘the voice of the people is the voice of God, however Islam is not a democratic 
religion even though it does respect democracy’.22 According to Rizieq, the Prophet 
Muhammad never discussed the specifics of an Islamic state and was concerned only 
with the creation of a society based upon Shari’a law (Rizieq 2005). Consequently 
FPI’s agenda was to reform public morality rather than directly challenge the nation-
state. In the opinion of Rizieq, ‘if the morals and character are not reformed then it 
would be useless to talk about reform in economy, political affairs, and law’ (Asia 
Times 2004a). This leads to the second theme fundamental to FPI’s ideology, the 
Qur’anic edict of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar, to lead people towards good and away 
from evil. It is this principle that has provided the rationale for FPI’s ongoing attacks 
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on Jakarta nightspots. The FPI worldview sees the Islamic community in Indonesia as 
under serious attack from western decadence and immorality. The spread of free-
market capitalism has manifested in the uncontrolled spread of businesses ‘peddling 
in vice’, such as discos, bars, entertainment centres etc (Alam 2004). While FPI 
considers it the responsibility of government to uphold morality, it recognises it as 
limited both by its administrative capacity as well as the presence of corrupt officials 
within its ranks. Hence, devout citizens have a right and obligation to defend their 
community, with violence if necessary.  
FPI activity has been most vigorous during the fasting month of Ramadan, the 
one most stepped in the symbolism of purification and cleansing for the Islamic 
community. In December 1999, around 4000 FPI members blockaded and occupied 
the office of the Jakarta regional government for over 10 hours, demanding that 
governor Sutiyoso close down all nightlife spots during Ramadan (Kompas 1999). 
After a lengthy meeting with Sutiyoso and police chief Noegroho Djajoesman, the 
governor issued a statement that he agreed with FPI’s demands, and would work with 
them to ensure that new regulations regarding opening hours were enforced. The 
protest was an unexpected strategic success for FPI, they gained concessions from the 
government and were essentially given a mandate to act in its absence. Between 1999 
up until its ‘de-activation’ in late 2002 FPI’s paramilitary wing carried out dozens of 
raids on nightspots, billiard halls, brothels, gambling dens and other places of ‘sinful’ 
activity throughout Jakarta  (See Laksamana.net 2003).23 Initially the raids were 
confined to the fasting month, but soon extended beyond it. It became apparent that 
FPI had a larger agenda to purge vice from the capital full stop. In some instances the 
raids involved little more than smashing signs and overturning tables. In others 
patrons, staff and local residents were attacked with clubs and machetes, buildings 
were burned down and FPI members clashed with local security and police. In at least 
one case FPI militia killed a local resident. Throughout the early attacks the response 
from the police had been non-committal. Routinely late to the scene, they made only a 
small number of arrests and released ambiguous statements that called upon the FPI to 
not break the law while simultaneously defending its democratic right to protest. 
Without a mandate or legal basis to act against the group as a whole, the police were 
confined to arrests of individual members proven to have committed criminal damage 
or assault. Rizieq’s attitude towards the police was far less ambiguous. Although 
rhetorically insisting that the FPI ‘didn’t dream of replacing the police’, he regularly 
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launched scathing and threatening verbal attacks, accusing the police of profiting from 
gambling and prostitution syndicates (Liputan6.com 2002b).  
By early 2001 relations between the police and FPI had grown increasingly 
tense. Under pressure from the entertainment industry, Sutiyoso revised the 1999 
regulations regarding opening hours during Ramadan, allowing businesses to operate 
in the evenings. Furious at the changes, FPI threatened to enforce a total ban during 
Ramadan. The police responded by counter threatening to crack down harshly on the 
group. The two had clashed violently in previous months, including an FPI attack on a 
police station, and an incident in which police fired shots into a van carrying FPI 
militia (Gatra 2003). In September 2001 FPI leaders and the police met and agreed to 
a ‘truce’ in confrontations Tempo (2001b). It did not last for long. While its anti-vice 
raids usually involved at most several hundred members, after the 11 September 
attacks in the US the FPI began to mobilise far larger actions, drawing on widespread 
opposition to the ‘war on terror’. In October 2001, at a demonstration against the 
pending invasion of Afghanistan by US forces, an estimated 10,000 FPI supporters 
rallied in front of the national parliament in what was the group’s largest mobilisation 
to date. In his oration to the crowd, Rizieq demanded that the government sever all 
ties with the US and threatened to do ‘sweeping operations’ to remove its citizens in 
Indonesia (Asia Times Online 2001). Fearful the demonstration would spiral out of 
control, the police moved in. The situation quickly deteriorated into a series of bloody 
pitched battles. The following day police raided FPI headquarters in Tanah Abang. 
Rizieq was detained on charges of inciting hatred over the demonstration, but later 
released.  
It wasn’t until after the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 that more decisive 
action was taken against the group. The bombing signalled the end of the 
government’s tolerance towards groups employing the symbolism of militant Islam 
such as FPI and Laskar Jihad. With international pressure on the Indonesian 
government to be seen as tackling radical Islam, militant groups were now a political 
liability. Rizieq was arrested four days after the bombing on charges of spreading 
hatred against the government and inciting public unrest in relation to FPI attacks on a 
pool hall and nightclub in Glodok on 4 October. Even while charging Rizieq the state 
was still conciliatory, reflected in the reduction of the penalty for the offences by the 
state prosecutor from the maximum of seven years to seven months on the grounds 
that Rizieq had ‘merely intended to improve the morality of Indonesian society’  
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(Laksamana.net  2003c). After a brief period in custody Rizieq was released and placed 
under house arrest on the condition that FPI would stop its raids. The following day 
the laskar wing of the group suspended its activities indefinitely (Tempo 2002). 
However the imminent US led invasion of Iraq saw FPI back in the spotlight, as it 
threatened ‘sweeping’ actions against westerners in Indonesia. At its headquarters in 
Tanah Abang, recruitment desks were set up for ‘jihad fighters’ to go to Iraq, with 
over 500 signing up (Far Eastern Economic Review 2003).24 Rizieq broke the 
conditions of his house arrest, making a ‘humanitarian’ visit to Iraq in April, 
apparently with the Red Crescent. On his return on 20 April 2003 he was immediately 
arrested and taken back into custody.25
Rizieq was confined to Salemba prison until November 2003. During his 
incarceration FPI continued to operate as an organisation, however the activities of its 
paramilitary wing continued to be suspended. Soon after Rizieq’s release FPI held a 
national congress to ‘reconsolidate’ it’s internal leadership, refocus its mission and 
formulate strategies for cleaning up its rank-and-file membership. Rizieq and 
Misbahul Alam both admitted that the group had ‘grown too fast’ and as a 
consequence had allowed what they termed ‘uncontrollable and undesirable elements’ 
to slip into its ranks (Alam 2004). Aside from unrepentant preman, this was also 
believed to include infiltrators linked to the police and businesses involved in 
gambling and prostitution (Alam 2004). Since its first raids, FPI had faced accusations 
that it was little more than a band of criminal extortionists in religious garb. Patrons of 
raided bars claimed to have been robbed, and nightspot owners accused FPI of 
extortion and collusion with the police. The allegations were taken seriously by 
Rizieq, who saw them as undermining the moral platform they claimed to stand upon. 
It was apparent that a gap had emerged between the short-term material self-interest 
of the ordinary membership and the ideological objectives of the leadership. In order 
to address the problem a number of measures were introduced. Membership criteria 
were tightened. Potential recruits now had to undergo a stringent screening process 
and entrance test, and once accepted undertake intensive training coordinated by FPI 
headquarters. Rather than acting as semi-autonomous units, laskar militia activities 
were coordinated centrally. If Rizieq’s imprisonment had the intention of 
undermining the group, the opposite was the case. FPI responded by tightening its 
ranks, centralising control over its component units, and upgrading the discipline and 
training of its recruits, moving it from an unruly bunch of thugs in religious garb to a 
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far more disciplined and ideologically motivated paramilitary force. During Ramadan 
2004 the FPI once more took to the streets, targeting cafes and bars in the Kemang 
district of South Jakarta (Asia Times Online 2004). As in previous years, the police 
threatened to act however failed to do so. Faced with continued police inaction, 
Kemang locals formed their own vigilante force to guard against possible repeat 
attacks, perpetuating the cycle of vigilantism. The moral justification for organised 
violence used by the FPI has apparently rendered the state reluctant to treat the actions 
as purely criminal. It has been loathe to support it, but also failed to act against it in 
any systematic way.  
The devastating tsunami that hit the war ravaged province of Aceh on 26 
December 2004 created a new arena for the FPI. Within two days of the tragedy 
several hundred volunteers FPI along with Habib Rizieq had arrived in Banda Aceh, 
their transportation provided by the government. Other paramilitary and militant 
groups such as Pemuda Panca Marga, Pemuda Pancasila and the Indonesian 
Mujahidin Council also flooded in en masse, ostensibly as part of relief efforts 
(Aljazeera.net 2005).26 For predatory groups, post-tsunami Aceh was new ‘territory’, 
and offered a host of both political and economic opportunities. Reports soon 
emerged of extortion rackets and the siphoning of aid supplies. The leadership of the 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM; Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) was quick to issue a statement 
calling the FPI a ‘criminal organisation’ and stating that its purpose in Aceh was to 
act on behalf of the Indonesian military.27 However, while not renowned for its 
humanitarian relief work, the FPI soon made a name for itself for its dedication to the 
grisly task of recovering and burying the dead.28 At the same time however it issued 
terse cautions to foreigners to respect the form of Islamic law practiced in the 
province, with Rizieq further warning of the possibility of ‘Christianisation’ by 
religion based aid agencies and an East Timor style intervention by foreign troops. 
Strategically, post-Tsunami Aceh is a perfect recruiting ground for the FPI. Its relief 
work has already won it guarded praise from locals, whilst its links to the military and 
open opposition to Acehnese independence ensures it government support. It’s 
particular brand of Islamic-nationalism fits well with the government’s autonomy 
package for the region, designed as an alternative to independence, and could see the 
FPI emerge as a significant player in the politics of post-tsunami Aceh.  
Like the FBR, FPI has been largely transparent in its flirtations with elite 
figures. Throughout its brief history the group has enjoyed the support of Habibie, 
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Wiranto, vice-president Hamzah Haz, and Amien Rais.  According to Rizieq, ‘we do 
not object to being used by others, and we will use others in order to uphold morality 
and eliminate vice’ (Asgart 2003). Neither the FBR nor FPI are state proxies, for this 
presumes the existence of the state as a unified entity. The relationship between 
vigilante groups and the post New Order state could be characterised more as one of 
strategic partial-patronage. At times the support of vigilante thugs has been beneficial 
to particular figures within the fragmented and competing elites. At the same time 
temporary patronage has allowed vigilante groups to operate with impunity and gain a 
degree of political leverage for agendas divergent from official state interests. The 
groups have undoubtedly served as a vehicle for the political opportunism of their 
leadership, yet this does not explain why both groups have been able to gain 
significant support bases amongst the urban poor. In the case of FBR, the material 
benefits of membership are tangible. With the FPI, especially post-reconsolidation, 
the primary motivation for involvement appears more ideological, and draws part of 
its appeal from the broader global discourse of Muslim radicalism and opposition to 
the west.  
 
A PREMAN STATE? 
As Hadiz has noted, political gangsters and vigilantes have been major beneficiaries 
of the introduction of reforms leading to a decentralized system of power in Indonesia 
(Hadiz 2003). This new system, that has given greater autonomy and power to 
regional and local government, has seen paramilitary groups and political gangsters 
become a valuable form of political capital, and influential power brokers in their own 
right, like their ancestors the jago of the colonial period. Some have aspired to more 
direct political power. In August 2003 the ‘granddaddy’ of preman/paramilitary 
groups, Pemuda Pancasila, formally registered its own political party, the Pancasila 
Patriot Party.29 Disillusioned with the lack of rewards for its long standing loyalty to 
Golkar, the head of Pemuda Pancasila, Yapto Soerjo Soermano, stated that ‘rather 
than choose a party who doesn’t care about us, its better we form our own party’ 
(Kompas  2003d). The organisations large membership networks enabled it to easily 
fulfil the necessary criteria, and it competed in the April 2004 general elections. 
While being far more established than other similar organisations, is it possible that 
other groups may eventually take the path of Pemuda Pancasila? The presence of a 
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‘preman party’ as a registered, albeit unsuccessful, competitor in the general election 
could be seen as eroding the legitimacy of the existing party system. Despite its poor 
showing in the elections, with just under one percent of the votes, the Patriot Party 
represents a self-proclaimed preman voice within the party system.  
If the patronage of political parties is no longer sufficient or too unpredictable, 
will satgas and vigilante groups seek to establish a more stable role for themselves as 
‘security agencies’, akin to the transition made by Brigass, or will demobilised rank 
and file satgas simply return to the streets to join the increasing ranks of street thugs? 
Rather than resulting in a decrease in violent thuggery, the temporary demobilisation 
of political paramilitary forces has seen an analogous increase in the emergence of 
violence as a commodity in the private sector. One example of this has been the 
labour sector. No longer able to rely solely on the police and military, factory owners 
have turned to gangs of hired thugs who specialise in intimidating workers and 
breaking up strikes.30 Thugs acting on behalf of powerful clients have also regularly 
targeted journalists and the media.31 In an attempt to establish a reputation as 
legitimate ‘businessmen’, some infamous gangland figures have even turned to the 
courts, seeking compensation from media outlets that have referred to them as 
‘thugs’.32  
Criminal gangs, vigilante groups and individual preman have established a 
lucrative yet unstable control over public space, such as markets, terminals and 
parking lots, creating further hardship for those living on the margins of the informal 
economy.  Preman based organizations are both a product of poverty and 
unemployment, and a factor further exacerbating it. Without the protection of the 
authorities that they once enjoyed under the territorial stand-over racket system, 
preman have now become vulnerable to attacks from rivals, as well as from a public 
that can no longer stand the burden of what amounts to an informal taxation system 
running in parallel to that of the state. A review of media reports over the last 18 
months indicates that there has been a steady increase in the number of retaliatory 
attacks and vigilante ‘street justice’ against preman. During the New Order, such 
attacks by the public were practically unheard of. The character of such extra-legal 
violence however is self-justificatory and hence cyclic in nature. 
Schulte Nordholt has suggested that on its current trajectory Indonesia is 
heading towards what he refers to as a ‘preman state’, similar to that of post-
Communist Russia (Nordholt 2002). The comparison with Russia is an intriguing one. 
 23
Vadim Volkov, in his study of Russian gangsters, has shown how criminal networks 
and thugs trafficking in violence have played a pivotal role in the making of Russian 
capitalism whilst simultaneously rendering the Russian state in functional disarray 
(Volkov 2002). After a period of fierce rivalry between criminal gangs in the mid-
1990s, stronger ‘violent entrepreneurs’ have gradually established semi-legitimate 
monopolies, becoming recognised guarantors of business transactions. Over time 
private security companies with closer links to government, often run my former 
KGB and military officers have commandeered these monopolies leading to the 
legalisation of private protection. Privatised sections of the state coercive apparatus 
have also become more independent market actors (Volkov 1999). Faced with myriad 
autonomous groups employing violence, the Russian state has lost ‘unconditional 
priority in those very areas that constitute it: protection, taxation and law 
enforcement’ (Volkov 2002: 752). Looking to the future, Volkov speculates that one 
possible scenario is a gradual appropriation of those private protection agencies with 
state links, leading to a re-centralisation of state control, albeit in a more dynamic 
form. This process entails not just controlling crime, but a fundamental rebuilding of 
the state.  The logic of the market, where intensive violence is simply unprofitable, 
could also emerge as a mediating factor (Volkov 2002: 753).  
Comparing the conditions in contemporary Indonesia, there are significant 
parallels. Like Russia, the semi-autonomous nature of the armed forces and its diverse 
business interests is a major hurdle towards the restoration of state control over 
organised violence. Curbing of satgas violence has come less from state intervention 
than from its political redundancy, the voting public can no longer be simply coerced 
into giving support. While groups such as FBR and FPI have connections to figures 
within the political elite, the current situation is far more fragmented than during the 
New Order; allegiances are largely tactical and for the achievement of short-term 
goals, hence they shift rapidly. Attempts to incorporate such groups within state 
structures could only be temporary, and would further erode public trust leading to 
more vigilantism. While it is perhaps easy to dismiss such groups as self-serving 
thugs, an understanding of the role played by ideology is crucial. With the breakdown 
in civic nationalism post New Order, appeals to local identity, ethnicity and religion 
have become a persuasive justification and motivating factor behind the use of 
violence that both intersects with and transcends material self-interest. At issue, then, 
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are not just particular configurations of political and economic power, but also more 
fundamental questions regarding what constitutes ‘Indonesia’ post New Order. 
The proliferation of paramilitary and vigilante groups post-1998 has seen the 
decentralisation of violence as a political, social and economic strategy with the state 
losing control as its sole legitimate source and patron. If we define the state in 
Weber’s terms, as the territorial monopoly over legitimate violence, then such groups 
appear to present a major challenge to restoring public confidence in state institutions 
and the judicial system. In the case of the FBR and FPI, violence and extortion is 
legitimised by recourse to ideological frameworks in which they conceptualise 
themselves as acting on behalf, or in lieu of, the lapsed state. Violence is justified as 
an act of necessary rectification rather than direct opposition, in a situation where the 
state has failed to provide staples such as security, justice and employment (Sung  
2004). This would appear to offer an opening to the state to engage with valid 
grievances whilst simultaneously enforcing the rule of law. So far, it has failed to do 
either. There have been various attempts by local governments to either ‘eliminate’ 
violent elements without elite backing, via shootings and mass arrests of individual 
preman by the police, or to incorporate them by employing preman as assistant police 
or public order officers, such as Sutiyoso’s ‘war on thugs’ (Detik 2004; Kompas 
2001). The rationale behind the recruitment is identical to that given by paramilitary 
and vigilante groups themselves, that with discipline and direction preman can be 
‘reformed’ and transformed into law-abiding and productive citizens. The message 
sent out is a contradictory one, and an indication of the functional disarray of state 
institutions. If this remains the extent of the state’s response it leaves the public 
caught between two distinct types of ‘thugs in uniform’, those with state backing, and 
those without. What may be required is a more broad ranging reconfiguring of the 
state, and an endeavour to address the deep-rooted social and economic causes of 
violence, something far more complex and ambitious than merely ‘tackling crime’. 
Similarly, the implications of this for further research on post New Order Indonesia 
include the importance of focusing upon informal constellations of power and their 
ramifications for the ongoing process of state building.  
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NOTES 
 
1 These included intimidating and attacking critics of the government, organising pro-government 
rallies, and ‘procuring’ funds via state sanctioned criminal activities such as standover rackets 
(O’Rourke 2002: 11). 
2 For more on the impact of decentralization reforms see the various contributors in Aspinall and Fealy  
(2003). 
3 Publicly, Wiranto denied coordinating and funding the vigilante forces, claiming that they were a 
‘spontaneous act of the people’. Pamswakarsa leaders themselves however named Wiranto as the 
architect of the force. See Tempo (1999a, 1999b). 
4In 2004 the Pamswakarsa affair came back to haunt Wiranto’s campaign for the presidency. Kivlan 
Zein accused Wiranto of still owing him nearly 5 billion rupiah (Aus$ 750,000) that Zein claimed to 
have paid out of his own pocket to fund the vigilante force. See Jakarta Post (2004). 
5 The Young Bulls came to public attention after 200 members were involved in an attack on the office 
of Tempo magazine in March 2003, after it ran a report implying that business tycoon Tommy Winata, 
a business associate of Taufik Kiemas, was behind a fire that destroyed the Tanah Abang market in 
Jakarta. Winata recently won a libel against Tempo over the accusation. The Komando Bela Mbak 
Mega was established in August 2001, the product of a split with the Komite Bela Mega (Defend Mega 
Committee), a Megawati supporter group set up in 1996.  According to KBMM’s chairman Herdy 
Mas, the group’s loyalty is ‘to Mega alone, not to the PDI-P’ (Kompas  2002).  
6 Kiemas has fostered close relations with numerous underworld figures, including Yapto 
Suryosumarno, head of Pemuda Pancasila. During demonstrations over rising fuel prices, Kiemas 
deployed Satgas PDI-P to guard his petrol stations, fuelling the perception that the role of satgas and 
party militia was merely to protect the business interests of the first family (Laksamana.net 2001).      
7 Pangaribuan is also a legislative candidate. In January 2004 he was accused of extorting 1.3 billion 
rupiah from the Jakarta Public Works Department. See Republika (2004).  
8 The PDI-P in Central Java prohibited its satgas to work as security for local businesses or as 
bodyguards, however this policy was not adopted by the national leadership. 
9 The average wage for a PDI-P satgas can be anywhere between 5000 to 50,000 rupiah per week.  
10 This number is based on various Indonesian media reports. The group itself claims to have up to 
150,000 active members. 
11 During colonial times jawara and jago acted as powerbrokers for the colonial and indigenous elite. 
On the relationship between the jago and the colonial state, see Nordholt (1991: 74-91). 
12 As Margareet Van Tillen discovered in her study on Si Pitung, the bandits’ relationship with the 
poor was largely predatory. (Van Tillen 1995). 
13 ‘Intelligence agents’ are a common part of many political and social organisations in the post New 
Order environment. 
14 A chronology of the FBR attack can be found on the UPC website at 
http://urbanpoor.or.id/28.23.0.0.1.0.phtml.  
15 Seven FBR members were arrested over the attacks, however Fadloli himself as a then member of 
the DPA, could not be arrested without the formal permission of President Megawati. The DPA itself 
severely reprimanded Fadloli, however Megawati made no comment on the incident. INFID (2002); 
Suara Merdeka (2002a).   
16 The IKBT started in 1998 as the product of a truce between rival ethnic gangs in Tanah Abang 
negotiated by the mayor of central Jakarta.  Led by a renowned Betawi thug, the group splintered after 
18 months along ethnic lines.   
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17 Later in June at a ceremony celebrating Jakarta’s anniversary, Sutiyoso symbolically ‘shot’ a statue 
meant to represent the ‘preman problem’. Horned and with eight arms, each holding a weapon, the 
statue also wore a tie, prompting some onlookers to suggest that it looked more like a politician than a 
preman (Tempo 2001a). 
18 Habib are Arab-Indonesians claiming familial descent from the prophet Muhammad. FPI’s founding 
committee also consisted several of seasoned Islamic radicals such as Habib Husein Al-Habsyi, who 
was jailed for the bombing of the 1985 Borobodur temple.  
19 The Front Pembela Islam Surakarta (FPIS) based in central Java is estimated to have around 12,000 
members, however its leadership operates independently of FPI.  
20 This figured is derived from media reports in Indonesia.  
21 FPI accused several student organizations such as the People’s Democratic Party, of being the basis 
for a resurgence of communism in Indonesia.  
22 In interview, Misbahul Alam said that he had held discussions with four generals where the 
possibility of armed Iranian type insurrection in Indonesia in order to achieve a state governed by 
shari’a law was discussed. He declined to name them, however it is documented that FPI has enjoyed 
the patronage of former generals Djaja Suparman and Wiranto. See Laksamana.net (2003b); Alam 
(2003). 
23 The Indonesian Human Rights Commission was also attacked in 2000 in anger over a report playing 
down the massacre of Muslims by the military in Tanjung Priok in 1984. 
24 Plans to send fighters were prevented by a lack of funds as well as the obvious logistical problems of 
getting fighters into the country. More recently Rizieq has threatened to send FPI militia to southern 
Thailand as well as Falluja in Iraq (Tempo 2004). 
25 After his arrest, FPI supporters helped Rizieq escape from the public prosecutors office, however he 
surrendered to police the next day.  
26 In 2003 Pemuda Panca Marga members attacked and ransacked the offices of the local NGO 
Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) after it criticised the imposition of 
martial law in Aceh.  
27 The full statement can be read on a GAM affiliated website; http://www.acheh-
eye.org/data_files/english_format/asnlf/asnlf_statements_data-eng/asnlf_statements_data-
eng_025_09jan2005.html.  
28In one instance FPI claims that GAM itself requested that they remove corpses from a conflict zone in 
order to avoid a confrontation between GAM and the TNI (Indo Pos 2005).  
29 Around 400 Pemuda Pancasila members already occupy seats in parliament throughout Indonesia, 
primarily as representatives of Golkar. After initially declaring it forbidden for PP members to be 
involved in political parties aside from the Pancasila Patriot Party, this was later changed; members are 
now free to do so, but will be labelled ‘failed cadre… not a cadre of the nation’. See Kompas (2003c) 
and Suara Merdeka (2003).  
30 One recent example of this is the beating and intimidation of workers from the Shamrock textile 
factory in Medan. See Wapada (2004) and Kompas (2004b). 
31 For documentation of attacks on the Indonesian press see Suwarso, Solahudin and Aditjondro 
(2002).  
32 This includes Hercules, the former gangland leader from Tanah Abang, Pemuda Panca Marga, as 
well as underworld figure and business tycoon Tommy Winata, who recently one a libel case against 
Tempo magazine.  
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